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The Problem of an Austro-German Union

THE problem of the union of Austria and Germany continues to agitate a large section of the European press, despite the fact that *Anschluss* was specifically prohibited in the peace treaties and has not been raised openly as an international issue for several years. The riots in Vienna last July brought to the forefront the question of Austria's ability to exist as an independent state and revived discussion of the *Anschluss* question. The visit of Chancellor Marx and Foreign Minister Stresemann to Vienna on November 15, was linked to the question of Austro-German union by many newspapers throughout the continent. Within the month, the *Anschluss* problem was raised in France in connection with the resignation of M. Franklin-Bouillon from the Radical-Socialist Party. M. Franklin-Bouillon's resignation was based partly on the fact that the Radical-Socialist Party had voted to cooperate with the Second International, which is working for evacuation of the Rhineland and had been in sympathy with Austro-German union.

This report, which is in no sense a plea for or against the *Anschluss*, traces briefly the history of the movement in its relation

to post-war developments in Central Europe. The problem has two distinct phases: (1) its international political implications, and (2) the internal forces involved in the movement in Austria and Germany.

The more important political implications are clearly apparent. The present Republic of Austria is a small, mountainous, landlocked country, situated almost exactly in the center of Europe. (See map p. 294). Its neighbors are Switzerland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy. Were Austria to join Germany, the map would be rudely altered. German territory would extend south to the Brenner Pass on the northern border of Italy, and would abut the German-speaking province of South Tyrol, acquired by Italy as a result of the war. Czechoslovakia, with a minority of 3,500,000 Germans in Bohemia, would be almost entirely surrounded by German territory—a Czech island in a German sea.

Three of the Succession States—Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia—are bound together by treaties of alliance forming the so-called Little Entente, which was formed in 1920-21 for the purpose of guaranteeing

to the signatories the benefits secured by the peace treaties, and to protect them "in case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary." Since Hungary's admission to the League of Nations in September, 1922, the Little Entente has been regarded as a concert with respect to general policy rather than a military alliance. All its members are, however, unalterably opposed to the union of Austria and Germany. At the May, 1927, meeting of the Little Entente in Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia, resolutions were passed reiterating the aims of the three allies to maintain the *status quo* on the basis of existing treaties. While the resolutions expressed the desire of Prague, Belgrade and Bucharest to improve their relations with Budapest and Vienna, especially in economic matters, they also stressed the fact that any move towards the *Anschluss* would be considered as a direct violation of the *status quo*.

The position of Hungary is somewhat different. The government is anti-French in sentiment and while not particularly pro-Austrian or pro-German it is not opposed to the idea of union, feeling that Hungary has little if anything to lose. Furthermore, the *Anschluss* would constitute a severe international set-back to France and to the members of the Little Entente. Hungarian relations with Rumania because of the Transylvania dispute are notoriously bad; the relations with Czechoslovakia are not good in spite of the Commercial Treaty concluded between the two states last March, after negotiations lasting almost three years. There is a sizeable Magyar minority in Slovakia, which is a thorn in the side of Hungary; and Czechoslovakia is very sensitive to any move to revise the boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Trianon. Even an unofficial suggestion, such as that recently made by Lord Rothermere of Britain that this Hungarian minority should be reunited with the Magyar State, caused intense excitement in Prague, followed by statements as to the "sacredness" of the *status quo*.

On April 5, 1927, Italy signed a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration with Hungary which was looked upon in Budapest as a great triumph. Hungary no longer considered itself friendless and isolated by the


Little Entente. Whether the existence of this treaty would seriously affect Hungary's attitude towards the *Anschluss*, in view of violent Italian opposition to such a step, is problematical.

CENTRAL EUROPEAN TREATY COMMITMENTS

The existing treaty commitments of the Central European states are so varied and complex that any move to disturb the *status quo* would obviously have unnumbered consequences. Yugoslavia is at odds with Italy over Albania; she is not too friendly towards Hungary, although she is against any change in Austria's status because of the German minority in the Banat, won at Austria's expense. Furthermore, Yugoslavia has just signed a Treaty of Non-aggression with France (November 11, 1927), which places her definitely as against Austro-German union. It is impossible as yet to determine the exact status of the Yugoslav-Italian Treaty of Cordial Collaboration signed January 27, 1924, in reference to the new Franco-Yugoslav Treaty. Italian-Yugoslav tension over Albania, however, together with the fact that Franco-Italian relations have not been cordial of late, point to the fact that the new treaty signifies a definite orientation of Yugoslav policy away from Italy and toward France. It seems, furthermore, a significant indication of the rising hegemony of France in the Balkans as opposed to Italian domination in that troubled section. Rumors were rife toward the end of 1926 that the Little Entente was fast expiring and that Belgrade, feeling uncomfortable at Rome, was flirting with the idea of a *rapprochement* with Berlin and Vienna, in spite of the fact that such a policy would probably have meant the end of Yugoslav opposition to the *Anschluss*. The final signature of the Franco-Yugoslav treaty marks the end, for the time being at least, of such a policy.

Czechoslovakia is bound closely to France by a Treaty of Alliance signed January 25, 1924. And lastly, Rumania is bound to France by a Treaty of Defensive Alliance of June 10, 1926.

Thus is Central Europe enmeshed in a network of treaties. Nevertheless, the *Anschluss* is a problem which seems pressing to a large



Prepared by the Foreign Policy Association.

POLITICAL MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE

number of Austrians and Germans. It is sure to crop up in any talk of revision of the Peace Treaties and it comprises one of the most serious problems in Central Europe today.

The psychological phase of the problem has its roots in the temperamental differences of the Austrians and the north Germans. The efficient, matter-of-fact north Germans, particularly the Prussians, are impatient with the easy-going Austrians. They have little patience with the well-known "*Gemütlichkeit*" of the Austrians and little respect for them. Many Austrians, on the other hand, regard the Prussians as stiff martinets, who do not appreciate the amenities of life. Furthermore, the Prussian desire for a strongly centralized government is distasteful to many Austrians. Were Austria a province of Germany, many Austrians feel

that her personality would be entirely submerged under the domination of a strongly Prussianized system of government emanating from Berlin. The thought of Vienna, once the capital of an empire of 52,000,000 people, subordinated to the Prussian city of Berlin is intolerable to them. Furthermore, in the Austrian provinces, patriotism is largely local; the inhabitants look upon themselves as primarily Tyrolese or Salzburgers, as the case may be, and as Austrians second.

It must not be forgotten, however, that, within the Reich itself, south Germany still resents the domination of Prussia. Austrians and south Germans feel themselves often more closely akin than south Germans and north Germans. As a result, many people feel that the solution of the problem lies in a decentralized Germany, removed from what they regard as the all-powerful

domination of Prussian Berlin, in which Austria could play a worthy rôle as a separate province.

Opposed to the psychological and international phases of the *Anschluss* movement is the grave question, uppermost in the minds of a majority of the Austrian people, as to the viability of Austria—her ability to exist as an independent state. Some observers state that the bad economic situation in Austria is the father of the desire for *Anschluss*; others feel that the opposite is true and that the economic situation is the result of a lack of will to improve it on the part of the Austrian people. The fact that Austrian reconstruction by the League of Nations, which was to have taken two years, lasted four, is cited as proof by the exponents of the latter school of thought.

HISTORICAL SETTING OF ANSCHLUSS PROBLEM

At the outset, the question of a possible union of Austria and Germany must be considered in its historical setting. From the mid-eighteenth century onward the age-long struggle for supremacy in Central Europe between Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, Austria and Prussia, was an outstanding factor in the affairs of the old Holy Roman Empire. Although the Germanic Confederation, formed in 1815, was headed by the Austrian Emperor, the succeeding half century saw the rise of Prussia to a position of great importance in the Germanies. From the outset the Confederation proved a fiasco, largely because the delegates in its Diet ranged themselves in two factions, one led by Austria and the other by Prussia. In the Germanies, especially in the north, there was strong popular feeling that the various states must be federated into one fatherland and that Austria-Hungary must be expelled from the Germanic Confederation. This is the so-called "Little German" or *Kleindeutsch* idea in contradistinction to the "Great German" or *Grossdeutsch* idea, which included Austria among the Germanies.

As a result of the revolutions of 1848, the abortive Frankfurt Assembly met to try and weld the 300 odd principalities of the Germanies into a single state. But the am-

bitious plans of the Assembly were blocked by Austria and Prussia in their death struggle to acquire once for all the leadership in a new and larger Germany. The Assembly split on the rock of *Grossdeutsch* as against *Kleindeutsch* and failed to accomplish anything.

In 1866, the Austro-Prussian War finally resulted in the expulsion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation and the *Kleindeutsch* North German Confederation was formed in 1867 without her. There followed the establishment of the German Empire under Prussian leadership in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War.

DIVERSE CHARACTER OF THE DUAL MONARCHY

The character of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary was a very important factor in this whole matter. The Hapsburg dominion was based upon personal loyalty to the reigning family and upon an ancient tradition of cosmopolitanism as opposed to nationalism. The majority of the population of Austria-Hungary was composed of subject nationalities—the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Poles, the Ruthenians and the Southern Slavs. Out of a total population of 51,300,000 in Austria-Hungary in 1910, there were only 12,000,000 Germans while the non-Teutons numbered over 39,000,000. But the Hapsburg rulers of this heterogeneous state, as well as much of its civilization, were Teutonic, and German was the most generally used official language. The Teutonic minority was able to exercise a predominant influence in the Dual Monarchy because of the divergent character of the non-Teutonic majority. In 1910 there were 10,000,000 Magyars, 4,000,000 Rumanians and Italians, 24,250,000 Slavs.

The Slavs were widely diverse in language and customs and were separated geographically. They were divided as follows:

Northern Slavs	{	8,500,000 Czechs and Slovaks
		5,000,000 Poles
		4,000,000 Ruthenians
Southern Slavs	{	5,500,000 Serbo-Croats
		1,250,000 Slovenes

By the *Ausgleich* (Compromise) of 1867 the whole dominion was split into two auton-

omous parts. Franz Josef of Hapsburg assumed the joint title of Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. It was this heterogeneous empire which was excluded from the North German Confederation in 1867.

The complex relations of Austria-Hungary and Germany, who were closely bound by the Triple Alliance, between 1879 and the outbreak of the war in 1914, are outside the scope of this report. It seems advisable, however, to say something about the so-called Pan-German movement before the war.

MYTH OF A PAN-GERMAN PLOT

In many quarters Pan-Germanism has been looked upon as one of the most important causes of the World War and the Pan-German League, which was the organization most concerned in furthering the movement, has been given the overwhelming responsibility for the outbreak of the war. As a matter of fact, subsequent research has disclosed that the Pan-German League (*Der Alldeutsche Verband*) was a small though noisy organization which exercised very little, if any, influence on the policy of the German Government. Its members were largely school teachers, professors and small business men and the masses of propaganda which the League has been credited with broadcasting all over the globe were a myth. Furthermore, the funds of the organization were extremely limited and its membership was not large. Since the object of the Pan-German League, according to its official constitution, was "to quicken the national sentiment of Germans and in particular to awaken and foster the racial and cultural homogeneity of all sections of the German people," its interest in the 12,000,000 Germans of Austria-Hungary was of course very strong. The League was *Grossdeutsch*, to use the terminology of 1848,* in its philosophy.

During the World War, the word Pan-Germanism became synonymous with German imperialism. But that the so-called "great Pan-German plan", by which it was plotted that the meshes of German influence should be spread from Hamburg to the Per-

sian Gulf, was initiated or even received much support from the Pan-German League is totally unsupported by the evidence. Though the League was interested in the Bagdad Railway, as it was in all expansionist schemes, it was much more interested in German-African affairs, especially in Morocco, and expended its energies in that field. Nor did the League have any connection with the German Government. No documentary proof has come to light that the Government even made use of the League, except as it used any political agency which supported its policies. And the governmental policies which met with the approval of the League and were supported by it were the exception, not the rule. There was no such thing as a great Pan-German plot.

Nevertheless, the fear of the Pan-German movement was very real at the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaties of Versailles (Article 80) and of St. Germain-en-Laye (Article 88) both contain articles concerning the independence of Austria.*

THE BREAK-UP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary as a result of the war has, of course, completely altered the map of Europe. Before 1914, the monarchy was actually a reigning House, the House of Hapsburg. And having come to power in an age when nationality was in no way a political or social force, the Hapsburg policy did not concern itself with the racial character of its subjects; the lands of the Austrian crown were many, and their inhabitants were varied, but as long as they owned allegiance to the crown, the House of Hapsburg was satisfied. Yet, in the end, the fall of the Hapsburgs and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary were due primarily to the rise of nationalism. Before the Great War, Swiss, Dutch, and Italian nationalism caused the loss of territories which had once owed allegiance to the House of Hapsburg; and German nationalism, seeking a closer union of the German States, overthrew Austrian hegemony in 1867. In the end, in 1918, the culmination of irrepressible nationalism of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Jugoslavs

*cf. Wertheimer, Mildred S., *The Pan-German League, 1890-1914*. 1924, Columbia University Press, New York. 256 pp.

*cf. p. 298, 300.

brought about the disruption of the Dual Monarchy. The outbreak of the war served in every instance to solidify national opinion and, out of the chaos, definite German, Czech, Polish, Yugoslav, Rumanian, Italian and Ruthenian groups crystallized. The adjournment of the Austrian Parliament just before the outbreak of the war made easier the repression of separatist and nationalist tendencies which became the Government's program from the beginning of the war, for in Austria no chance was given for popular expression of opinion. The inevitable outcome of such a governmental policy was revolution.

FINAL EFFORTS TO SAVE THE HAPSBURG EMPIRE

After the death of Franz Josef, and the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the increasingly obvious symptoms of war-weariness compelled the new Emperor, Karl, to call the Reichsrat on May 30, 1917. At once the long repressed national feelings of the various racial elements exploded in the form of national manifestos which menaced the very existence of the monarchy.

Matters went from bad to worse from the Hapsburg point of view and by December, 1917, the campaign of the subject nationalities was being waged abroad in the attempt to secure recognition of the national states by foreign powers. Even the purely German elements, becoming keenly conscious of their German nationality, were enraged by the relentless anti-national policies of the Hapsburgs. Finally, as the process of dissolution became more evident, Emperor Karl proposed the Socialist panacea for the Austrian problem—federalization of each of the various nationalities as a commonwealth. A committee was appointed to investigate the possibility of federalization; but when the Reichsrat, which had been prorogued during the summer of 1918, met on October 1, 1918, to hear the report on the proposed federalization, it was too late. In reply to the Government's plan, the German-Austrian Social Democrats, constituting the second largest German political party, laid down a program that paved the way for the liquidation of the monarchy. The plan was based on the fundamental principle that only in the hands

of the deputies from particular regions lay a mandate for action which could be construed as constitutional.

The German-Austrian groups had agreed to such a course of action by October 5, and as a result abandoned all thought of a united Austria. But the hour of revolution had come, and discarding the Dual Monarchy, the Empire and even the antiquated historical thought of "Austria," the German-Austrians sought refuge in the concept of self-determination on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and ultimately in the thought of union with the German Fatherland. As a result, the German-Austrians were the first group to withdraw from the Reichsrat.

The influence of the Austrian Social-Democratic party seems to have been largely responsible for this action. The fact that they had had no responsibility in the past policy of the Hapsburg Government allowed them to exercise influence incommensurate with their number and gave them a sort of moral ascendancy over the other Austrian parties.

In a final attempt to avert catastrophe, Emperor Karl on October 16, 1918, issued his long-heralded Federalization Manifesto, which was regarded in Hungary as tearing down the structure of the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and therefore the entire basis of the Dual Monarchy. When, on October 18, President Wilson answered the Austro-Hungarian peace proposals by recognizing the independence of the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs, the *Ausgleich* was irretrievably shattered. This caused the various nationalities to follow the course outlined in the Federalization Manifesto and to organize as separate commonwealths. The existence of a common federal government was, however, ignored and when the Reichsrat met on November 12, 1918, every state in the Austrian half of the Monarchy had proclaimed its independence. The Emperor had withdrawn from the affairs of Austria and the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist.

As early as October 21, 1918, the German-Austrians had started to organize themselves into a provisional National Assembly. Independence was declared and three presidents were chosen, representing the three

main political parties: the Social Democrats, the Christian Socialists and the German National Party. Committees and councils were appointed and, with the withdrawal of the Emperor, Austria was able legally to construct a provisional government.

COURSES OPEN TO AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC

The dissolution of the Empire had broken both political and economic ties and Austria was left to decide her own fate. Economically isolated by the Czechs and Hungarians, at least she no longer had a problem of nationalities. Two courses, aside from independent existence, seemed open to the new Austria; she might either endeavor to form a Danubian Confederation which would preserve the economic unity of the Dual Monarchy or she might throw in her fate with Germany.

A Danubian Confederation seemed impossible in view of the intense racial hatreds which had disrupted the Empire, and which had been intensified by the rampant and triumphant nationalism of newly acquired independence. Leadership from Vienna was quite out of the question. Union with Germany, just then in the throes of a republican revolution, seemed both natural and easy. The armistice, signed on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points, gave support to Austria's claims for the right of self-determination and at that time the Austrians could see no obstacle to reunion with Germany. It seemed historically consistent that Austria, which had been excluded from the North German Confederation in 1867, should reenter a democratized Reich after the World War. Here again the driving influence of the Social Democrats made itself felt. Strongly opposed to any attempt to revive the old Empire in any fashion, they were against a Danubian Confederation from the outset, and leaned heavily on the idea of union with Germany. Thus the *Anschluss* movement began, seemingly not to be stopped by internal difficulties but only by the commands of the Allied Powers at Paris.

A speech of the late Dr. Viktor Adler, editor of the important Socialist *Wiener Arbeiterzeitung*, on October 21, 1918, contains the following significant statement summarizing this policy:

"We demand the same right [of self-determination] without reserve and without limit for our German people as well [as for the other nationalities of Austria-Hungary]. The German people in Austria is to form its own democratic State, its German National State, which will decide with complete liberty what its relations are to be with the neighboring peoples and with the German Empire. It will unite itself to its neighbor peoples in a free league of nations, if these peoples wish it, but if the other nations refuse this fellowship, or will only assent to it under conditions which do not meet with the economic and national needs of the German people, then the German-Austrian State, which, if forced to depend upon itself, would have no capacity for economic development, will be compelled to annex itself to the German Empire as a special Federal State. We claim for the German-Austrian State complete liberty to choose between the two possible connections. . . ."

The Austrian Socialists, although they held only about one-fifth of the seats in the National Assembly in which Dr. Adler made this speech, were clearly the driving force in that body. They represented the masses of organized labor and had a moral ascendancy over the German Nationalists and the Christian Socialists—the Hapsburg clericals—whose past policy had resulted in national collapse and humiliation. These facts made Adler's speech the more significant.

In Germany, the Revolution had taken place and the Kaiser had abdicated on November 9, 1918. The Austrian Emperor followed suit on November 11, and German-Austria was free to make her own choice as to her form of government. Following the example of Germany, which had proclaimed the Republic on the ruins of the Hohenzollern Empire, Austria, on November 12, had proclaimed itself not only as a Republic but as an integral part of the German Republic. The draft Constitution passed that day by the Austrian National Assembly, contains the following paragraph:

Article II. German-Austria forms an integral part of the German Republic. Special laws shall govern the participation of German-Austria in the legislation and administration of the German Republic, and shall determine the force of laws and customs of the German Republic in German-Austria.

It is significant to note that the earlier proclamations of the State Council and the German-Austrian Declaration of Independence of October 21, 1918, speak of the "German people in Austria"; the official name of

the new Republic from its birth until October 17, 1919, was "German-Austrian Republic."

AUSTRIAN PARTIES ASK FOR ANSCHLUSS

The programs of the three major political parties of the new republic, published early in 1919, before the terms of the Peace Treaty were known, contained definite statements concerning union with Germany. The program of the German National Party (*Gross-deutsche Volkspartei*) was of course based entirely on the desire for *Anschluss*. The Christian Socialist Party (*Christlichsoziale Partei*), in Paragraph VI. of its program stated:

VI. Negotiations as to the date and the prior conditions for realizing the attachment of German-Austria to Germany are to be instituted without delay. In these negotiations care is to be taken that German-Austria's economic interests are absolutely secured. The negotiations are to be conducted by the State authorities with the addition of men approved by the National Assembly.

The Social Democratic Party's program of February 19, 1919, Section IV, Paragraph 1, read as follows:

IV. The negotiations with the German Empire, with regard to the attachment of German-Austria to the Empire, must begin at once. The attachment must be accomplished as soon as possible.

Section VI, Paragraph 1, of the same document is also significant:

VI. A social political commission shall be appointed in agreement with the German Empire, to prepare unification and reform of the right of working men and employees, the creation of a uniform German labor code, extension of the protection of labor and employees and social insurance, with the utmost speed. The German sickness and old age insurance is to be extended to German-Austria as quickly as possible, complete self-administration of those insured being provided for. . . .

The domestic program of the Renner Ministry, the first Government of the new Republic, published March 5, 1919, stipulated:

Adaptation of civil and criminal law to that of Germany, codification of labor laws, including the rights of public and private employees; reform of the whole system of education from the primary school to the university.

It was of course necessary in Austria, as in all the Succession States, to organize a constitutional government as soon as possible. Elections were held for a Constituent Assem-

bly on February 16, 1919, and the Assembly met in Vienna sixteen days later. Out of a total of 170, the Social Democrats had a plurality with 72 deputies; the Christian Socialists had 69 and the German National Federation 26. There were besides a Zionist, a Czech from Vienna and a so-called "Bourgeois Labor" representative. The balance of power was thus left in the hands of the German parties.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PROCLAIMS UNION WITH REICH

The National Constituent Assembly, reiterating the provisions of the Constitution of November 12, 1918, passed a law on March 12, proclaiming German-Austria a democratic republic, and declaring again that German-Austria was a constituent portion of the German Reich. The Constituent Assembly also reorganized the national government and consolidated the entire internal administration into six departments. The departments of foreign affairs, military affairs, transport and food-supply were temporarily unprovided for until the projected union of German-Austria with the German Reich should have been consummated, provision being made for reorganization and for ministers without portfolio to serve during the period of transition. The Constituent Assembly also formally recognized the coalition cabinet, previously formed under Chancellor Karl Renner (Social Democrat) as the executive of the new Republic.

In submitting his program to the Constituent Assembly, Chancellor Renner had especially stressed the national solidarity of the German-Austrians and the need of union with Germany. He also outlined a policy of socialization for the Republic, which closely paralleled the German project made at about the same time.

Germany, after the war and the revolution, was of course faced with a multiplicity of problems of the most pressing character. The question of union with Austria was only one of these and naturally did not appear as important to the new German Government as to the Austrian, which felt that the very survival of the State depended on this solution of its difficulties. The German Government was, however, strongly in favor of the

Anschluss. The provisional constitution of the German Reich, published the end of January, 1919, contains the following provision:

Article 2, Paragraph 2. If German-Austria joins the German Empire, it shall be entitled to take part in the States' Committee, with a representation to be fixed by Imperial Law. Until then, it will take part as a consulting voice in the deliberations.

PEACE CONFERENCE VETOES ANSCHLUSS

In the meantime, while the new German-Austrian Republic was organizing its government on the lines already indicated, the Peace Conference was meeting in Paris to decide the fate of the Central Powers.

The decision of the Peace Conference to forbid the union of Austria with Germany, according to M. Tardieu, the French publicist and politician, was taken largely in deference to French views. The motives which prompted this decision of the Peace Conference seem to have been the safeguarding of the independence of Czechoslovakia in her early days and the belief that a plebiscite in Austria on the question of union with Germany would at that time have been influenced by the desperate situation in Austria and other temporary considerations. Furthermore, had the union been permitted, Germany would have gained a large piece of territory and 6,500,000 inhabitants as a result and would, according to the French view, have emerged from the war which she had lost, with a large share of the spoils. When the Austrian delegation arrived in Paris, they were therefore confronted with the unalterable veto of the Conference on the inclusion of German-Austria in Germany.

Another important act of the Peace Conference was its insistence on the change of the name of the new Republic from "German-Austria" to "Austria." On the face of it a minor matter, the significance of this action lay in the fact that it meant that "Austria" did not have the right or power to speak in the name of all the Germans of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. This right had been maintained by the German-Austrian delegation, but according to the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, the boundaries of the new Austria were delimited so as to exclude some 3,700,-

000 Germans in Czechoslovakia, and in German Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass in Italy. The fate of the Klagenfurt basin in southeastern Austria (see map p. 294) was decided by a plebiscite provided for in the Peace Treaty and held October 10, 1920. In the voting, 22,025 ballots were cast for Austria and 15,279 for Yugoslavia,* the entire area being awarded to Austria as a result. After considerable trouble, the province of West Hungary, the Burgenland, as it is called, was ceded to Austria by Hungary. A plebiscite was held in the town and environs of Sopron (Oedenburg) on December 17, 1921, at which 15,334 votes were cast for Hungary and 8,227 votes for Austria. The latter maintained that the plebiscite was attended by many irregularities, but Sopron was awarded to Hungary, the rest of the province going to Austria.

Austria, therefore, consists of nine provinces: Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Vienna. Its population numbers approximately 6,500,000, of which Vienna has a population of almost 2,000,000.

Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, forbidding the union of Austria and Germany, reads as follows:

The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power.

Similarly, the Treaty of Versailles contains the following Article (80):

Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

GERMAN CONSTITUTION AND THE ANSCHLUSS VETO

In Germany, as previously indicated, the Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919, contained (Article 61, Paragraph 2) the following provision:

*Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, IV, p. 309.

German Austria, after union with the German Reich, shall be represented in the Reichsrat by votes corresponding in number to its population. Meanwhile the representatives of German-Austria shall have a deliberative voice.

However, the Constitution in Article 178, Paragraph 2, stipulates that "The provisions of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, shall not be affected by this Constitution." The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at Paris, feeling strongly that Article 61 of the Weimar Constitution did affect the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, addressed an ultimatum to Germany, on September 2, 1919, stating that they had examined the German Constitution of August 11, 1919, and observed that the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 61 constitute a formal violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. They reminded Germany of Article 178 of the Weimar Constitution (quoted above) and invited the German Government "to take the necessary measures to efface without delay this violation by declaring Article 61, Paragraph 2, to be null and void." The note went on to state that this violation of its engagements on an essential point by the German Government would compel the Allied and Associated Powers "if satisfaction is not given to their just demand within 15 days from the date of the present note, immediately to order the extension of their occupation on the right bank of the Rhine."

REPLY OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

The German Government replied that it regarded the repeal as unnecessary in view of Article 178 of the Weimar Constitution. They added that it was assumed in Germany that Article 61 could not come into force unless the League of Nations agreed to the union of Austria and Germany. In view of this reply, the Conference contented itself with insisting that the German Government should formally recognize the principle that no article in the German Constitution could be valid if it were contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The matter was ended on September 22, 1919, by the chief of the German delegation signing a diplomatic act reiterating that all of the provisions of the Weimar Constitution which are in contradic-

tion to the Versailles Treaty are null and stipulating that:

The German Government declares and recognizes that in consequence Paragraph 2 of Article 61 of the said Constitution is null, and that in particular the admission of Austrian representatives to the Reichstag could only take place in the event of the consent of the Council of the League of Nations to a corresponding modification of Austria's international situation. . . .

The vote of the League Council must be unanimous since the question is not one of procedure. Therefore the vote of a single power can forbid the *Anschluss*.

AUSTRIA'S RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBORS

Following the revolution of 1918, Austria's relations with her neighbors were far from friendly, with Italy occupying South Tyrol and the Czechs holding German Bohemia. Relations with Germany were intimate. Of the Allied Powers, France was the first to pave the way for the renewal of friendly relations by sending an Ambassador to Vienna. The other Powers were slow in sending permanent representatives. From the first, France worked for the inalienable independence of the little Austrian Republic, her policy being to prevent Austro-German union at all cost.

Meanwhile, in both Berlin and Vienna, the campaign for union had gone on until the eve of the publication of the peace terms with Germany, when the French Foreign Office notified the Austrian Government that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided that no union of the two countries could take place.

The news came as a severe blow to the Austrian Government. The foreign policy of the new Republic had from the outset been directed almost entirely toward the union with Germany and all attempts at reconstruction of an economic union on the basis of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had been abandoned. Racial, political and tariff barriers surrounded Austria on every side and the Austrian people were firmly convinced that the separate economic and political existence of the tiny state was impossible. An Austrian delegation was summoned to Paris, and after long correspond-

ence, the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye was signed on September 10, and ratified by the Constituent Assembly on October 17, 1919.

Aside from the serious economic situation in which Austria found herself as the result of the war and the break-up of the Dual Monarchy, the 'Austrians felt deeply aggrieved that the Powers had dictated to them and that they were not allowed to exercise what they considered to be their inalienable right of self-determination. This feeling was intensified by the fact that the newly acquired independence of peoples formerly subject nationalities of the old Empire had been vociferously acclaimed as based on the right of self-determination.

In a speech presenting the Peace Treaty to the Constituent Assembly for ratification, Chancellor Renner stated that he was convinced that Austria would, when the time was ripe, press for permission to join Germany with the full consent of the League Council.*

However, the complete economic dependence of Austria on other countries for her food supply forced her to submit more or less passively to the demands of the Allied Powers.

BAUER RESIGNS IN PROTEST

The signature of the Treaty of St. Germain was the direct cause of the resignation from the Austrian Cabinet of the Socialist Foreign Minister, Otto Bauer, although the Coalition Government as a whole managed to weather the difficult summer of 1919.

As Bauer explained in a speech** made immediately after his resignation, the chief end and aim of his foreign policy had been union with Germany, which he felt was an economic, political and cultural necessity for the Austrian people. It was economically necessary because Austria had no coal, woefully insufficient foodstuffs to feed her own people, since she was cut off from the Hungarian and Transylvanian grain fields, and no large export industry, now that her richest industrial sections belonged to

Czechoslovakia. Politically, her geographical position was impossible—a land-locked state, largely Alpine in character and surrounded by hostile neighbors. Bauer, together with other Social Democrats, believed that, culturally, the provincialism of the peoples comprising the various provinces of Austria, made the creation of a truly national state an impossibility. Joined to Germany, this would not be a drawback, but rather the Austrian people "could then be a part of the great life of a great people."

The reorganized coalition and finally a so-called *Proporz-Kabinett* (formed of all the parties in accordance to their strength in the Constituent Assembly) governed Austria until October, 1920, when federal elections took place under the new Constitution which had meantime been drafted. This Constitution is a triumph of the idea of Federalism and is in many ways like the Swiss Constitution; indeed it borrowed heavily from Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist*.

VETO ACTS AS SETBACK TO AUSTRIAN CENTRALIZATION

The official ban of the *Anschluss* by the Peace Treaties gave a severe setback to the forces which were working for national unity and the continuance of centralized government. The Socialists, who formed the largest element favoring centralization, controlled for the most part only the province and city of Vienna. In the provinces, the Christian Socialists had a majority almost everywhere except in Lower Austria. After the peace, the rift between these two parties grew constantly wider and with the balance of power largely in the hands of the third party—the Greater German (*Grossdeutsche*) party—government by coalition became increasingly difficult.

The first year of the independent Republic created in the masses of the provincial people a feeling that the unity of the Republic was no guarantee of prosperity, either political or economic. To the masses of the peasants, the only hope of bettering the situation seemed to be in ending the independent life of the Republic by the incorporation of the various provinces in Germany. This was further intensified by the peasants' distrust for the Socialist government in Vienna and

**Stenographische Berichte*, Sept. 6, 1919. p. 766, 767.

**Bauer, Otto. *Acht Monate auswaertige Politik. Rede gehalten am 29 Juli, 1919.* Vienna, Verlag Wiener Volksbuchhandlung.

by their deep-rooted hostility to the capital city, which had its basis in the autocratic government of the Hapsburgs.

The city of Vienna includes a concentrated population dependent on a system of banking, trade and industry originally adapted to the requirements not of a small country but a great empire. The new frontiers, with their formidable economic barriers, separated the city population from a large part of their normal food supply and the main industries from their raw materials and their markets. These facts, added to the absence of internal cohesion within the new boundaries, the resulting difficulty of any form of common government and the depreciated currency, made it more and more impossible to make the supplies of the country available for the capital. Vienna was not only reduced to being the capital of a small country, but it was isolated within its own boundaries.

During 1920 and 1921, economic conditions became even more serious. The tendency of the Republic to break up into component provinces was evidenced in plebiscites which were held in Tyrol and Salzburg in April and May, 1921, respectively, in which the inhabitants voted overwhelmingly for incorporation of these individual provinces with Germany. Styria was prepared to hold a plebiscite in June, 1921, when Allied protests caused Vienna to take a firm hand. The plebiscite did not take place, although the ministry was forced to resign.

POWERS FORCED TO RECOGNIZE AUSTRIA'S PLIGHT

Meantime, Austria's plight had been recognized by the outside world. The new Republic had been admitted to the League of Nations at the First Assembly in December, 1920, a step which bound her even more strongly by the terms of the Peace Treaties. During 1919, 1920 and 1921 Austria's economic existence was sustained by means of public loans from France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States and by credits from a number of neutral countries amounting to more than £25,000,000. Added to these were extensive charitable expenditures amounting to \$50,000,000. But the country could not go on living on charity alone and its actual financial position was in fact worse than ever.

By March, 1921, the four principal Allied Powers, recognizing that relief must give way to reconstruction, asked the League of Nations to propose a general scheme of reconstruction. As a result, the League Financial Committee, on April 4, 1921, stated the main conditions on which they considered that the restoration of Austria could be achieved. Among these was the early decision by all the governments concerned to postpone any claims in respect of reparation and relief credits for a long period such as twenty years.

The details of the League reconstruction scheme need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that it necessitated negotiations with many governments, which were drawn out for such a long period of time that conditions went from bad to worse in Austria and it was only on October 4, 1922, that the necessary agreements were finally signed and the scheme could go into operation.

MOVES TOWARD ECONOMIC COOPERATION

In the meantime, the Austrian Government had realized that the fate of the new Republic was inseparably bound up with that of the other Succession States of the Dual Monarchy. All were very poor and since their birth as independent states, they had been waging tariff wars. Finally under the leadership of Dr. Beněš of Czechoslovakia, a non-political conference of the Succession States was held at Portorosa, October 15-November 25, 1921, which paved the way for subsequent economic treaties. In December, 1921, the Austrian and Czechoslovak delegates met at Lana and signed a treaty by which the two states mutually guaranteed "their territories as fixed by the Treaties of Peace," and pledged neutrality in case of war. Czechoslovakia then extended credits to Austria as a basis for the resumption of ordinary commercial intercourse.

The Lana Treaty aroused intense ire in the Greater German party in Austria, for they felt that it indicated a tendency away from union with Germany and towards a Danubian Confederation. Despite this opposition the treaty was ratified, but the Greater German party resigned from the Government in protest.

SEIPEL SEEKS FOREIGN AID

The financial aid received from Czechoslovakia gave only temporary relief and conditions in Austria became steadily worse. In March, 1922, a Jesuit priest, Mgr. Ignatz Seipel, a member of the Christian Socialist Party, became Chancellor. A man of great vigor and ability, he at once instituted a program of ruthless reduction of national expenditures and made a definite appeal for foreign aid in the reconstruction of Austrian finances. Seipel made a pilgrimage to Prague, Berlin, London and Verona and by the time the Third Assembly of the League of Nations met in Geneva in September, 1922, he had come to terms with Austria's creditors. It should be added that the threat of *Anschluss* with Germany was used as a club to force the Allied Powers to take action speedily and save Austria whose independent existence was obviously threatened by the dire financial straits in which she found herself. Rumors were rife at this time that Austria, in spite of the prohibitions of the Peace Treaties, would join with Germany. There was even talk of union with Czechoslovakia, and Italy went so far as to announce that any such move would be regarded in Rome as a *casus belli*. Another persistent rumor indicated that there was talk of a custom's federation or even a political union between Austria and Italy itself! Viewed from the perspective of the intervening five years, these rumors can be classified as threats or warnings that something drastic must be done at once to save Austrian independence, but at the time, this fact was not so obvious.

Nor were Seipel's activities without results. On October 4, 1922, the three Protocols were signed, instituting the League's scheme for the financial reconstruction of Austria. The first Protocol is significant in a study of the *Anschluss* question. Signed by Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Austria it read in part:

The Government of His Britannic Majesty, the Government of the French Republic, the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic . . . solemnly declare:

That they will respect the political independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty

of Austria; that they will not seek to obtain any special or exclusive economic or financial advantage calculated directly or indirectly to compromise that independence; . . .

The Government of the Federal Republic of Austria. . . .

Undertakes, in accordance with the terms of Article 88 (see p. 300) of the Treaty of St. Germain, not to alienate its independence; it will abstain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this independence.

This undertaking shall not prevent Austria from maintaining, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, her freedom in the matter of customs tariffs and commercial or financial agreements and in general, in all matters relating to her economic régime or her commercial relations, provided always that she shall not violate her economic independence by granting to any state a special régime or exclusive advantages calculated to threaten this independence

Thus the fundamental principle upon which the League reconstruction scheme was based was the continued independence of Austria and once again that independence was guaranteed by an international agreement. Seipel returned to Vienna and after some difficulty succeeded in having the Protocols ratified by the Austrian Parliament. All the Bourgeois parties voted for ratification, the Social Democrats voting against it, because they felt that Austria was being sold out to foreign capitalists. In December, 1922, Dr. A. R. Zimmerman, the League Commissioner-General, assumed his office and the Reconstruction scheme went into force.

GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD ANSCHLUSS

In this consideration of the *Anschluss* question, very little has been said about the attitude of Germany to the problem, beyond the provisions of the Weimar Constitution. Faced with overwhelming difficulties, the German Republic was in no position, and in fact was too deeply immersed in the problems of reparations and the difficulties in adjusting her new frontiers, to take the initiative. Then too, Austria was in such dire financial straits and its currency was so depreciated that Germany, viewing the matter realistically, could not but question the wisdom of add-

ing what might constitute a great liability to the Reich. Added to this, Austria's share in reparations was also indeterminate, she was responsible for the pension list of Austria-Hungary and economically there seemed no way in which she could pay her own way. Nor must the inherent dislike of the efficient Prussians for the easy-going Austrians be forgotten. Aside from the extremely definite and real prohibitions of the Peace Treaties there were many items to consider on the debit side of the ledger.

On the credit side, however, came first and foremost the sentimental and patriotic national argument that the Austrians were in reality Germans and that based on the right of self-determination of nations, they should naturally form part of a German national state—the old idea of 1848 of a *Grossdeutsch* nation. Many people in Germany, particularly in South Germany, felt that Bismarck's *Kleindeutsch* solution of the problem of unifying Germany in 1867 by excluding Austria had been fundamentally wrong and that one of the natural results of the Great War was the re-solution of this problem along *Grossdeutsch* lines.

POSITION OF PRINCIPAL GERMAN PARTIES

The principal German political parties have recently (1926) expressed themselves on this subject in various ways.

The SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (with 131 seats in the Reichstag*) is for the union and one of their leaders, Dr. Paul Löbe, the President of the German Reichstag, is probably the most ardent and active advocate of the movement in the Reich. Furthermore, in spite of internal party difficulties and differences of opinion, the addition of the large and flourishing Austrian Social Democratic party to the ranks of the German party would of course give the latter enormously increased strength.

The GERMAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (with 32 seats in the Reichstag) which is a liberal, free trade party is in favor of a commercial union for Central Europe which would remove tariff barriers.

The CATHOLIC CENTER PARTY (with 69 seats in the Reichstag) is *Grossdeutsch* in

spirit and believes in *Anschluss*. Here, too, the addition to the ranks of the party of the Catholic Christian Socialist Party in Austria would be a great tactical advantage.

The GERMAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (with 51 seats in the Reichstag) of which Dr. Stresemann is the leader is mildly for the *Anschluss*. As one of their leaders expressed it, however, "The *Anschluss* is on our party program but it is not one of the most pressing or imminent problems." Actually the most realistic party in Germany as concerns foreign affairs, it seems to feel that even though a desirable thing, the time is not yet.

The BAVARIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (with 19 seats in the Reichstag) is entirely *Grossdeutsch* in its program. It is of course very pro-*Anschluss* although it feels that the "German brothers" in Bohemia (Czechoslovakia) should be included. Furthermore this Bavarian party is strongly imbued with the doctrine of states' rights and decentralization and is very anti-Prussian in sentiment, feeling probably on the whole more kinship with Vienna than with Berlin.

The GERMAN NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY. This party, the successor to the Conservative Party of Imperial Germany, and composed largely of Prussian Junkers, has a mild statement in its program concerning the *Anschluss*. Philosophically, the Nationalists are of course for it, just as they are for the protection of all Germans outside the borders of the Reich. Their program says: "A close relationship binds us to all Germans outside the Reich, in particular to the Germans in Austria, to whose right of self-determination we pledge ourselves."

In general, it must be said, however, that these statements are to be regarded for the most part as mere lip-service to the idea of *Anschluss*. The German trade unionists regard the *Anschluss* as a danger to their position, for the Austrian standard of living is lower than the German and were Austrian workers to compete with Germans in the Reich, wages would be lowered and unemployment probably augmented.

The Right parties in Germany are afraid of the addition of the Austrian Social Dem-

*There are 493 members of the Reichstag in all.

ocrats and Catholics to the ranks of the German Social Democratic and Center parties. The political balance in the Reich is at best precariously close and any augmentation of their numbers by the addition of Austrian members would upset this balance considerably. The anti-Catholic parties of the Right in Germany see in the *Anschluss* the formation of a Catholic majority which would work havoc even against the combined Protestant parties.

On the other hand, the Nationalists would naturally be patriotically inclined to welcome their Austrian brothers and to rejoice in the addition of 6,500,000 people and 32,000 square miles of territory to the Reich. However, the present European situation is such that it appears that the responsible Government of the Reich is not anxious to press the matter for the present at least.

AUSTRIAN ATTITUDE SINCE 1922

The Austrian side of the *Anschluss* movement since 1922 is less definite than before the League reconstruction scheme went into effect. After December, 1922, the major effort of the Republic was of course expended in carrying out the terms of this agreement. Outside aid had been secured, the *Anschluss* problem seemed to be less pressing, although the Austrian depression of spirit resulting from the recent hardships continued to be very marked. This spirit manifested itself in a certain lack of will to survive and hampered the course of reconstruction considerably.

However, from 1922 until early in 1925, conditions in Germany were so bad that, naturally enough, the Austrians temporarily lost interest to some extent in joining their fate with that of the Reich. During the years immediately after the war, Germany had seemed to the impoverished Austrians to be a pillar of strength on which they could lean in their hour of need. Then the German mark started down the toboggan slide, the German printing presses began to work overtime and all the ills and uncertainties of inflation which the Austrians knew so well from experience became evident in the Reich.

Popular enthusiasm in Austria for the *Anschluss* seemed to decline, it might be said, in direct proportion to the value of the mark.

But it cannot be said that pro-*Anschluss* sentiment was dead in Austria at that time—far from it. A good deal of propaganda still went on, although the whole matter had begun to take on a more academic flavor and become rather a cause to work for than a burning political issue. Then, in Germany, the Dawes Plan was put into operation in 1924-5, and the financial situation placed on a firm footing, and the Reich again appeared as a possible strong prop.

In 1925, an organization called the "*Oesterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund*" (Austrian-German People's Union) was organized under the presidency of Dr. Löbe, (Social Democrat), the president of the German Reichstag, with headquarters in Vienna and a Berlin office as well. This organization is the chief propagandist agency of the *Anschluss* movement. It purports to have a very large membership in both countries and to be backed by a large section of public opinion on both sides of the border. Meetings are held, a good deal of propaganda material is issued and the association seems very active. Certainly with the removal of the League of Nation's control of Austria, talk of the possibility of the *Anschluss* has become more and more prevalent.

During the 1925 presidential campaign in Germany, Dr. Marx (Center Party), the present Chancellor, who was at that time running against General von Hindenburg, made a statement in favor of *Anschluss* which caused a good deal of excitement at the time. He said that he felt that "the oldest country of German culture is Austria. The annexation of the brother state of Austria and the creation of a greater Germany, the dream of more than a century, can be demanded now when the security compact (this was in April, 1925; the Locarno Conference took place in October, 1925) is under discussion." Nevertheless, Germany had and still has, a great number of problems to solve and feels strongly that many other clauses of the

Peace Treaty are unjust. Locarno has come and gone without any definite action concerning the *Anschluss*. When Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, the advocates of *Anschluss*, notably through the *Oesterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund*, announced emphatically that the question was now the most burning problem in Europe. And indeed the Central European press carries a good deal of news concerning the movement, pro and con, just as it carries news of the many burning issues in the territorial settlements made at Paris which concern the Succession States.

LEAGUE ECONOMIC SURVEY OF AUSTRIA

Before the League control was removed, an investigation into the economic situation of Austria was made for the League Council by an eminent British and a distinguished French economist. The report presented by Mr. Layton and Professor Rist answers the question—"Can Austria live?"—in the affirmative, stating that "the question must obviously be answered in the affirmative in respect of a nation whose economic life at the moment is showing slow but definite signs of improvement." The report goes on to urge the introduction of more economic methods into industry, trade and banking as a solution of Austria's difficulties and the initiation of a "new commercial policy based on the ideal of economic cooperation rather than on that of narrow self-interest"—in other words cooperation between the various Succession States instead of customs barriers and tariff wars. It is interesting to note, however, that the official League of Nations' document, which publishes the report of Mr. Layton and Professor Rist, contains as well, in the appendix, a memorandum by the Austrian Chamber for Workers and Employees, dated July, 1925, which states: "It is the view of the Chamber that any thorough and permanent reconstruction of the economic life of Austria can only be effected in conjunction with some larger economic unit, within which all our present difficulties could be removed. In view of past events which led to the dissolution of the Monarchy, union with the neighbor states could never be so

close as to form the basis of a single economic system. Political-commercial agreements with individual Succession States could no doubt secure certain advantages, but they would not provide a solution of the problem.

"The realization of this, together with an instinctive sense of close national relationship, has bred a firm conviction of the necessity of union with the German economic system."

PRESENT STATUS OF ANSCHLUSS QUESTION

League control of Austria was removed on June 30, 1926 and the question at once arises as to the status of the *Anschluss* movement since that time. Certainly it has been more in the news both in Europe and America within the past year and the Austrian people are thinking more about the question than they did a year ago. A good deal is said about the necessity for non-political cooperation between the two countries along cultural, educational, economic and legal lines. The new German and Austrian penal codes, now in process of formulation, have been drafted with close cooperation between Vienna and Berlin, although at present a struggle is going on concerning the abolition of the death penalty which Vienna strongly favors while Berlin does not. The Austrian Minister of Justice, Dr. Dinghofer, is a leader of the *Anschluss* movement in Austria, though that fact may or may not have significance.

That the Austrian Social Democrats are not as keen for the *Anschluss* at present as they were immediately after the war is a further factor which must be considered. Early in July, 1927, Otto Bauer, the leader of the Left wing of the Austrian Social Democratic party, is reported to have published an article analyzing the various movements towards union with Germany. These he describes as, first, the proletarian-revolutionary phase of 1918-1919, then the reactionary provincial movement of 1921, and finally what he calls the bourgeois movement of the present day. This trend toward the Right, Bauer is reported to have said, has led the Socialists to revise their point of view and from being whole-heart-

ed supporters of the *Anschluss*, so long as Germany was looking towards the Left, they now feel that there could be no union with the Germany of General von Hindenburg.

As in Germany, the Austrian Social Democratic party has both a moderate Right wing and a more radical Left wing. This reported development doubtless signifies a further weakening of the *Anschluss* movement by connecting it with internal party struggles.

That there is a kinship between the Austrians and the Germans seems obvious. They speak the same language and have to a certain extent a common cultural background. Identical legal systems, similar educational requirements, especially in regard to university entrance, abolition of

passport visas between the two countries, lowering of tariff barriers — all might be considered as moves towards the union of the two countries. On the other hand, they can also be viewed as conveniences designed to make available to both countries the best of their common culture.

Viewing the question from the all important economic side and considering Austria's ability to exist economically as an independent state, there would seem to be no particular legal difficulties in the way of economic cooperation between the two states. Tariff barriers could be removed, free interchange of goods and workers could be arranged for without actual political union, provided both states really desired such a solution of the problem.

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